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Does Mood Explain the Monday Effect? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
A number of studies have explored the sources of the Monday effect, according to which 
returns are on average negative on Mondays. We contribute to the literature by exploring 
whether a direct measure of mood explains the Monday effect. In line with psychological 
literature, a greater proportion of investors is more pessimistic in the early days of the week, 
and become more optimistic as the week progresses. We use novel daily mood data from 
Facebook across twenty international markets to explore the impact of mood on the Monday 
anomaly. We find that the Monday effect disappears after controlling for mood. In line with 
our hypothesis that mood drives the Monday effect, we find that the Monday effect is more 
prominent within small capitalisation indices and within collectivist and high uncertainty 
avoidance countries. Investors could consider mood levels to forecast Mondays with more 
(less) pronounced negative returns.  
KEY WORDS: behavioural finance; Monday effect; Facebook mood index 
JEL classification: G1, G34  
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INTRODUCTION 
The Monday effect is one of the most widely published stock market anomalies, according to 
which Monday returns are negative or significantly lower than those of other days of the week, 
and Friday returns are the highest. French (1980) provided early evidence of such price pattern 
in the US market during the 1950s to 1970s. The Monday effect is also observed in 
international markets, as evidenced in Jaffe and Westerfield (1985), Condoyanni et al. (1987) 
and Tong (2000). These studies indicate that the Monday effect is an inherent phenomenon that 
is not confined to certain markets. A number of rational explanations have been put forth for 
the Monday effect; however, empirical results have been inconclusive. We contribute to the 
literature by exploring whether a direct measure of mood explains the Monday effect.  
There are a number of studies from the psychology literature supporting the so-called 
‘blue Monday’ hypothesis. Earlier studies observe that mood tends to be lowest on Monday and 
highest on Friday and during the weekend (Farber, 1953; Pecjak, 1970). Daily mood does not 
randomly vary but fluctuates in a seven-day cycle that peaks around or close to the weekend 
and falls sharply on Monday and Tuesday (Croft and Walker, 2001; Larsen and Kasimatis, 
1990; Reis et al. 2000; Stone et al., 1985). Stone et al. (1985), McFarlane et al. (2006) and 
Stone et al. (2012) also observed that Monday’s participants mood is not significantly different 
from that of Tuesday’s. Daily mood fluctuation therefore seems to coincide with price 
fluctuations as reported in Monday returns.  
 Prior studies in finance have noted that mood may explain the Monday effect. For 
example, Rystrom and Benson (1989, pp.75) noted that “Monday is not similar with other days. 
For many people, it is the start of five long days of work after two days of leisure, and many 
people begin their work week with a certain amount of reluctance. Monday is often 
characterized as a "bad" day. Other days of the week do not have this reputation. By Friday, 
most people are looking forward to two leisure days with a positive attitude”. However, 
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Rystrom and Benson (1989) did not empirically test the hypothesis. Gondhalekar and Mehdian 
(2003) is the only study that used data to explore a potential link between mood and the 
Monday effect. However, they only used indirect proxies of mood: discounts on closed-end 
funds, returns on small stocks, consumer confidence and consumer reluctance towards buying a 
house. They also only explored results within the US market, where the Monday effect has 
been weakly evident (e.g., Kamara, 1997). Regardless, Gondhalekar and Mehdian (2003) found 
that the Monday effect is more pronounced in periods of pessimism, signalling that an irrational 
explanation may drive the Monday effect. 
We empirically explore a direct measure of mood and test whether mood explains the 
Monday effect. The lack of daily mood data may explain why little empirical investigation has 
been undertaken in the field. Conventional sentiment indices (e.g., the Baker and Wurgler 
index, the University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index and the Consumer Confidence 
Index) are normally available with a monthly frequency in the US market. We instead use daily 
mood data from Facebook that are available for twenty international markets. Recent studies by 
Siganos et al. (2013) and Karabulut (2013) have validated the Facebook index, showing that 
returns and mood are positively related, in line with other conventional sentiment indices. Our 
study is the first to use Facebook’s data to focus on the Monday effect. The availability of 
international mood data from Facebook does not limit our research to developed markets (such 
as the US), where the Monday effect is weakly evident (e.g., Kamara, 1997). As preliminary 
analysis, Figure 1 shows returns per day of the week on days with the highest (Panel A) and 
lowest (Panel B) 10 percent mood. This is the first indication that mood and returns are 
positively related. Returns are significantly lower in days with poor mood, especially Mondays.       
[Please insert Figure 1 here] 
          We use data from between September 2007 and March 2012 across twenty 
international markets and find that the Monday effect is present within our sample of 
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countries. We further find that mood is positively related with Monday returns. More 
importantly, after controlling for mood, we find that the Monday effect disappears. We 
further find that the Monday effect is stronger in small (rather than large) capitalisation firms, 
in line with the theory that small investors who are more influenced by mood tend to transact 
in small firms (De Long et al., 1990). We further explore a cultural impact on our results. In 
line with Schmeling (2009), we find that the Monday effect is more prominent within 
collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance countries, providing further evidence that 
psychological factors are behind the Monday effect. We finally explore the economical 
significance of the results from the standpoint of an investor. We show that mood levels can 
be used to determine whether the negative returns are more/less pronounced on Mondays. If 
investors can forecast mood levels, by taking a long position when mood is good and a short 
position when mood is bad, they can generate on average profit of 0.273%. We find that the 
Monday effect is more pronounced on days with pessimism within a market and less 
pronounced on counterpart Mondays with optimism.            
 We contribute to the literature as follows. This is the first study that uses a direct 
measure of mood to explain the Monday effect. We find that the Monday effect is present in 
international markets, but disappears after controlling for mood. Second, we show that the 
Monday effect is stronger within small capitalisation firms and within countries where 
participants are more prone to overreaction. These results offer further evidence that mood is 
behind the Monday price pattern. Third, this is the first paper that explores a social media 
factor to explore the Monday effect. Apart from a general link between sentiment/mood on 
returns, trading volume and volatility that has been previously reported (e.g., Joseph et al., 
2011; Schmeling, 2007; Edmans et al., 2007), this study highlights the significance of mood 
in generating a price pattern in stock markets.   
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          The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The second section reviews 
relevant literature and develops hypotheses. The third section discusses the data and 
methodology used. The fourth section reports the empirical results and the final section 
concludes.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Prior studies have documented that average daily returns vary across various assets and 
markets (Copeland and Wang, 1994). In particular, Monday average returns are negative and 
significantly lower than those on other days of the week. The last trading days of the week, 
usually Friday, are associated with positive and significantly higher returns than other days of 
the week. This anomaly is termed the Monday, or the weekend, effect. French (1980) 
provided some early evidence of unexplained yet consistent negative Monday returns in the 
US S&P 500 index from 1953 to 1977, which he then used as a basis to question the extent of 
market efficiency. Beyond US data, the Monday effect is observed in international markets, 
such as in the UK, Japan, Australia and Canada (Jaffe and Westerfield, 1985), and in 
developing markets (Condoyanni et al., 1987). Chang et al. (1993) and Tong (2000) provided 
evidence in more diverse market settings, including less developed markets.  
          These studies attempt to explain the Monday effect, but results are inconclusive. The 
Monday effect has been attributed to measurement errors, such as where high returns on 
Fridays are subsequently reversed on Mondays (Board and Sutcliffe, 1988; Keim and 
Stambaugh, 1984); the gap between trading and settlement days (Gibbons and Hess, 1981); 
corporations’ tendency to release news over the weekend (Damodaran, 1989); and individual 
investors’ tendency to sell on Mondays, which leads to a fall in prices (Abraham and 
Ikenberry, 1994).  
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          More recent studies have also found that the Monday effect is not as strong in recent 
data, and in many cases, especially within developed markets, the pattern has disappeared or 
even reversed. However, most of these studies observe that the Monday effect is persistent 
within smaller capitalisation indices. For instance, Kamara (1997) found that the Monday 
effect was present in both large and small stocks before the introduction of futures in the 
contract in the US stock market in 1982. After that period, however, Kamara (1997) found 
that the Monday effect disappeared within large capitalisation firms but persisted within 
counterpart small capitalisation firms. This finding is in line with Gibbons and Hess (1981) 
and Brusa et al. (2000).  
          Only a few studies have explored irrational explanations of the Monday effect. 
Rystrom and Benson (1989) and Jacobs and Levy (1988) suggested using emotion and mood, 
in particular the blue Monday hypothesis. They argued that the majority of investors feel 
more pessimistic on Monday than on other days of the week. Hence, they are less willing to 
buy or more willing to sell shares on Mondays compared to other days. The basic premise of 
this hypothesis asserts that investors are affected by systematic mood changes that cause 
negative pressures on Mondays and positive price pressures on Fridays. However, these 
studies only theoretically suggest the relation between mood and the Monday effect. To our 
knowledge, only Gondhalekar and Mehdian (2003) have empirically tested the relation 
between mood and the Monday effect. However, they used indirect proxies of mood: 
discounts on closed-end funds, returns on small stocks, consumer confidence and consumer 
reluctance to buy a house. Their study also focused on the US market, where the Monday 
effect has been weakly evident (Kamara, 1997). We contribute to the literature by using a 
direct proxy of mood based on Facebook’s index, which is available for twenty international 
markets. Based on the discussion above, we develop the following hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 1: Mood is positively related with Monday returns. After controlling for mood, 
Monday anomaly become insignificant. 
A number of studies (e.g., De Long et al. 1990, Schmeling 2009) also report that 
sentiment is more strongly related with returns within small firms, which small investors tend 
to trade more heavily in. Small investors tend to trade within small capitalisation firms; this is 
the common proxy used in the literature. Schmeling (2009) also explored whether cultural 
variables have an impact at the level of mood within international markets. According to 
Chui et al. (2010), there is a higher likelihood of herding among investors within collectivist 
countries, and there is more evidence of overreaction among investors from high uncertainty 
avoidance countries. Our additional hypotheses are therefore as follows:    
Hypothesis 2: The effect of mood on the Monday effect is stronger within small 
capitalisation firms.  
Hypothesis 3: The effect of mood on the Monday effect is stronger within countries whose 
participants are more prone to overreact.   
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
We obtain daily mood data from Facebook’s Data Team across the following twenty 
markets1: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Germany, India, 
Ireland, Italy, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and Venezuela. The coverage of the study is limited by 
Facebook’s availability between September 2007 and March 2012. Mood data is compiled by 
Facebook’s Data Team from status updates by millions of Facebook users.  
                                                          
1 To our knowledge, Facebook’s Data Team employs users’ IP addresses to identify their country of origin.   
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The procedure to generate the mood index is explained in detail by Kramer (2010). In 
short, they determine a positive/negative percentage of the status updates based on the Text 
Analysis and Word Count programs. To identify ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ words, they follow 
the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count dictionary. They undertake the following estimation 
to estimate mood: 
nall
nallnt
pall
pallpt
it
xxxx
GNH
σσ
−
−
−
=                                                (1) 
          where itGNH is the mood of country i  at day t , ptx and nix  show the average positive (
p ) and negative ( n ) words used respectively on day t  for the country, and  pallx , nallx pallσ  
and nallσ are the average ( x ) positive and negative words used over the duration of the index 
and the standard deviation (σ ) of those variables. Facebook’s Data Team excludes the 
highest and lowest ten percent of the days when estimating allpx , , allnx , allp,σ  and alln,σ  to 
minimise the impact of extreme values on the estimation of daily mood levels. Due to such 
data elimination, the average mood is not equal to zero. In line with Siganos et al. (2013), we 
exclude mood data above the 99th percentile, as they are normally related with outlier 
messages such as “Happy New Year” or “Merry Christmas”.  
          We download market performance data for the countries from Datastream. Empirical 
tests are undertaken using Datastream’s market indices (TOTMK). For robustness, we further 
estimate the relation between the Monday effect and mood on small (MSCI small) and large 
(MSCI large) indices, since small investors, who are more influenced by mood (e.g., DeLong 
et al., 1990), tend to invest in small capitalisation firms (e.g., Lemmon and Portniaguina, 
2006). Logarithmic returns are estimated. 
We explore whether mood explains the Monday effect by undertaking the following 
estimations:  
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Rit = ± +b Mondayit + c Moodit + d Mondayit * Moodit + Country Dummies+ uit       (2) 
R(F-M)it = ± + b Mood(F-M)it + Country Dummies + uit                      (3) 
Rit is the daily natural log returns of indices i for day t, while ± is a constant variable 
that represents the average of non-Monday returns. Mondayit is a Monday dummy that takes 
the value of 1 if returns are observed on Monday, and 0 otherwise. Coefficients for Mondayit 
capture Monday’s average return relative to other days’ average returns. Moodit is the mood 
proxy estimated by Facebook and Moodit*Mondayit is the interaction variable. F-M is the 
difference in returns/mood between Friday and Monday. Nineteen country dummies have 
been added to control for country variations. An insignificant coefficient on Mondayit and on 
the constant at Model 3 would indicate that the Monday effect disappears after adjusting for 
mood.               
                                                         
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Does mood explain the Monday effect? 
We first explore the univariate results for mood and returns. Results are shown for mood in 
Panel A of Table I and for returns in Panel B of Table I. In line with the ‘blue Monday’ 
hypothesis, we find that mood is on average less negative as time passes, in days, towards the 
end of the week, and becomes positive on Sunday. We also find the first evidence that the 
Monday effect is present in our sample. Average Monday returns are -0.092 percent; such 
performance is the lowest of all days of the week.    
[Please insert Table I here] 
We undertake regression analysis to explore whether mood explains the Monday 
effect. Table II shows the results. Column (1) supports the above result that the Monday 
effect is present in our sample. The coefficient for Mondayit is negative and significant at the 
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1 percent level, showing that Monday returns are significantly lower than returns on other 
days of the week. Interestingly, Column (2) shows that when incorporating the mood and the 
interaction between mood and Monday returns in the model, the coefficient of Mondayit 
becomes insignificant. This result indicates that mood explains the Monday effect. We find 
that both coefficients on mood and on the interaction variable are positive and statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. Column (3) uses Model (3) to explore the robustness of the 
results when the difference between mood and returns between Friday and Monday is 
regressed. Results remain strong, further supporting the notion that mood is behind the 
Monday price pattern. When controlling for mood, the unexplained difference in returns 
between Friday and Monday is insignificant.  
[Please insert Table II here] 
Overall, the ‘blue Monday’ hypothesis is supported, showing that the Monday effect 
is driven by irrational/behavioural reasoning. Our results therefore support Hypothesis 1.   
 
Robustness tests 
We undertake a number of additional tests to explore the robustness of prior results. We first 
test whether the recent financial crisis drives our results. Garcia (2013) found that sentiment’s 
impact on returns is more pronounced during recessions. During a recession, fear and 
emotions have a more widespread impact across participants. We find that most countries’ 
market indices tend to reach their lowest point on 6th March, 2009. We therefore split the full 
period into during and after the financial crisis and re-estimate Models (2) and (3) for each 
sub-period.2 Panel A of Table III shows the results. In line with Garcia (2013), we find that 
                                                          
2 In the particular test, we examine results for Argentina and Mexico separately, since they have a significantly 
different cut-off point from that of the remaining countries. In unreported results, we find that results remain 
robust for both countries. 
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mood is positively related with Monday’s returns especially during the recent financial crisis. 
More importantly, for the purpose of our study, the Monday effect disappears after adjusting 
for mood at both sub-periods.    
[Please insert Table III here] 
 We further explore whether results are driven by particular weeks where mood is 
highly correlated across the countries in our sample. During weeks in which important global 
news is announced, mood is expected to be relatively highly correlated across countries. 
However, during weeks in which no significant news is available, the mood across countries 
is likely not to be correlated.  
To test whether the relation between mood and Monday returns is affected by 
different levels of correlation in mood, we first estimate the weekly correlation of mood 
across the countries in our sample. Based on median values, we then split weeks into high 
and low correlation, and re-estimate Models (2) and (3) for each sub-sample separately. Panel 
B of Table III shows the results. We find that the results are to a large extent qualitatively 
similar for both sub-samples. We find that mood is significantly related with Monday returns 
in both sub-samples. Overall, these findings further support Hypothesis 1. 
  
Results within small and large capitalisation indices 
We further test whether prior results are driven by Datastream’s estimation of market returns 
(TOTMK). We use MSCI index returns and re-explore prior relationships. Among others, De 
Long et al. (1990) and Schmeling (2009) have reported that sentiment is more strongly 
related with returns within small firms which tend to be more heavily traded in small 
investors. That may explain why studies (e.g., Kamara, 1997) find that the Monday effect is 
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more prominent within small capitalisation firms, since these are the firms in which small 
investors tend to transact.   
          Table IV shows the results within small (Panel A) and large (Panel B) capitalisation 
indices. In line with the developed hypothesis that mood drives the Monday effect, we find 
that the Monday effect is more prominent within small (rather than large) indices. Column (1) 
indicates that the coefficient on Mondays is -0.106 (significant at the 1 percent level) and -
0.0654 (significant at the 10 percent level) for small and large MSCI indices, respectively. 
When we control for mood, Monday’s coefficient reduces significantly for both small and 
large indices. Monday’s coefficient becomes insignificant for large, but significant at the 10 
percent level for small, indices. The coefficients for both mood and the interaction variable 
between mood and Monday remain positive and significant at the 1 percent level. Column 
(3), which uses Model (3) to explore the robustness of the results, also shows that the 
unexplained difference in returns between Friday and Monday is insignificant after 
controlling for mood.   
[Please insert Table IV here] 
          Overall, we provide further support for our results above regarding the significance of 
mood to Monday’s price pattern. In line with Hypothesis 2, we find that the Monday effect is 
stronger within small capitalisation firms.    
 
The impact of culture  
The above analysis used all twenty countries in the sample to explore the impact of mood on 
the Monday effect. We further generate sub-groups of countries to explore whether culture 
has an impact on the relation between mood and returns. In particular, we use the country’s 
individualism level and the uncertainty avoidance index as constructed by Hofstede (2001). 
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In line with Schmeling (2009), mood is expected to be stronger within collectivist and within 
high uncertainty avoidance countries. According to Chui et al. (2010), there is a higher 
proportion of herding among investors within collectivist countries, and there is more 
evidence of overreaction among investors in high uncertainty avoidance countries.    
       We manually collect culture variables for each country from Hofstede’s website.3 Based 
on the countries’ cultural level, we then split them into two equal-sized sub-groups and re-
estimate prior regressions for each group separately. Table V shows the results when 
Datastream’s (TOTMK) indices are employed to capture market performance. In line with 
Schmeling (2009), we find that the Monday effect is more prominent within collectivist and 
high uncertainty avoidance countries. For example, the coefficient on Monday is -0.111 and -
0.064 for low and high individualism countries, respectively. More importantly, the mood 
and the interaction variables between mood and Monday returns are always significantly 
positive within all sub-groups. Apart from high uncertainty avoidance countries, the Monday 
effect disappears after controlling for mood.  
[Please insert Table V here] 
Overall, we provide further support for our results regarding the effect of mood on the 
Monday effect. In line with Hypothesis 3, we find that the strength of the relation between 
mood and the Monday effect is related to cultural factors; the Monday effect is more 
prominent within collectivist and high uncertainty countries. After controlling for mood, the 
Monday effect tends to weaken significantly across all country sub-groups.   
 
 
 
                                                          
3 http://geert-hofstede.com/national-culture.html (last accessed December 2013). 
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Economical significance 
We further explore the economical significance of prior results from the standpoint of an 
investor. Mood is strongly related with Monday returns, and in this section, we explore 
whether an investor could consider mood, making the Monday effect stronger. We first 
explore conventional strategies developed in the literature to explore the robustness of returns 
within our sample. We estimate Monday returns and Monday returns conditional to prior 
week’s market performance. Jaffe et al. (1989) and Mehdian and Perry (2001) reported that 
when prior week’s market performance is poor, Monday returns are more pronounced. Panel 
A of Table VI shows daily returns for above strategies. The naïve Monday strategy generates 
returns equal to -0.092 per cent for the full sample. We further confirm results of prior studies 
(e.g., Jaffe et al., 1989), showing that when the prior week’s returns are on average negative, 
negative Monday returns are more pronounced (-0.008 vs. -0.121, for the full sample).  
[Please insert Table VI here] 
We generate additional strategies on the Monday effect focusing on the significance 
of mood levels. Based on Monday’s mood, we split weeks into positive and negative days 
and estimate returns for both portfolios.4 Panel B of Table VI shows the results. We find that 
mood has a significant impact on returns. When mood is positive, Monday returns are 
positive, at 0.129 percent. In contrast, when mood is negative, Monday returns are 
significantly negative, at -0.1444 percent. The difference in returns between Mondays with 
positive and negative mood is therefore 0.273 percent, which is statistically significant at the 
1 percent level. The impact of mood on Monday returns tends also to be stronger than the 
counterpart impact of prior week’s market performance on returns. The positive minus 
negative arbitrage portfolio is for example 0.114 for the conventional strategy and 
                                                          
4 In unreported results, we find that the profitability of strategies based on top/bottom decile and quintile 
portfolios is relatively similar to that shown for positive and negative mood.       
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significantly higher at 0.273 for the mood/Monday developed strategy (full sample). We 
estimate daily returns for the full sample as well as for alternative portfolios based on size 
indices and cultural variables. We find similar return patterns across alternative size and 
cultural portfolios, indicating the robustness of the profitability of the developed strategy.  
Overall, we highlight the significance of mood on Monday returns from the 
standpoint of an investor. We show that a strategy that short sells the market on Mondays 
when pessimism prevails and buys the market on Mondays with prevailing optimism, 
generates significant profitability.    
   
CONCLUSION 
A number of studies have investigated rational explanations for the Monday effect; 
however, they have not reached a consensus. We focus on a behavioural explanation for the 
Monday effect, according to which the ‘blue Monday’ hypothesis drives the results. There is 
plenty of evidence in the psychology literature (e.g., Farber, 1953) that supports the 
developed hypothesis, according to which investors are more pessimistic early in the week. 
To our knowledge, this is the first study that uses a direct mood index to empirically test the 
relation between mood and the Monday effect.  
In particular, we employ Facebook’s daily mood index across twenty international 
markets to test the developed hypotheses. We empirically support that mood drives the 
Monday effect. After adjusting for mood, the Monday effect tends to disappear. We further 
show that the Monday effect is stronger within small capitalisation firms and within 
collectivist and low uncertainty avoidance countries, giving further evidence that mood is 
behind the Monday effect. Small capitalisation firms are mostly traded in by small investors 
who are influenced most by mood (e.g., De Long et al., 1990). Also, participants within 
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collectivist and low uncertainty avoidance countries are more prone to overreaction (e.g., Chu 
et al., 2010).  
We further explore how investors could take advantage of the findings of the study. We 
find that Monday returns are significantly lower when where there is pessimism among 
participants in a country, and significantly higher returns are experienced on Mondays with 
prevailing optimism. The strategy could therefore be to short sell the market on Mondays 
with prevailing pessimism and to buy the market on Mondays with prevailing optimism.   
Overall, we support behavioural reasoning to understand the Monday price pattern. Future 
research may explore the impact of mood to understand other daily stock price patterns, such 
as that around merger announcements.     
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Table I. Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Std. Dev Max Min 
Panel A: Mood 
    Monday -0.012 0.023 0.143 -0.106 
Tuesday -0.016 0.024 0.141 -0.108 
Wednesday -0.015 0.024 0.146 -0.113 
Thursday -0.013 0.024 0.145 -0.183 
Friday -0.009 0.025 0.146 -0.161 
Saturday -0.003 0.025 0.145 -0.132 
Sunday 0.000 0.028 0.144 -0.131 
     
Panel B: Returns     
Monday -0.092 1.782 15.078 -13.676 
Tuesday 0.035 1.458 16.046 -7.396 
Wednesday 0.039 1.461 8.286 -9.377 
Thursday -0.052 1.456 7.745 -9.199 
Friday -0.028 1.394 9.352 -12.745 
This table reports aggregated mood/returns for all twenty countries according to the day of the week (Panel 
A/Panel B). We use Facebook status updates to proxy mood across twenty international markets. Returns are 
logarithmic and Datastream’s indices are used to capture market performance (TOTMK). The sample period is 
between September 2009 and March 2012.    
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Table II. Regression analysis 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mondayit -0.091*** -0.040 
 
 
(0.000) (0.174) 
 Moodit 
 
2.523*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 Moodit *Mondayit 
 
4.295*** 
 
  
(0.000) 
 Mood(F-M)it 
  
2.248 
   
(0.267) 
_cons 0.062 0.090** -0.026 
 
(0.173) (0.049) (0.870) 
N 21,902 21,902 4,113 
F statistic 1.400 3.825 0.876 
This table explores whether the Monday effect is present in our sample (Column 1) and whether mood explains 
Monday returns (Columns 2 and 3). We estimate the following key OLS regressions: Rit = ± +b Mondayit + c Moodit 
+ d Mondayit * Moodit + Country Dummies+ uit  and R(F-M)it = ± + b Mood(F-M)it + Country Dummies + uit, where 
Rit is the daily natural log returns of indices i for day t, while ± is a constant variable that represents the average of 
non-Monday returns. Mondayit is a Monday dummy that takes the value of 1 if returns are observed on a Monday, 
and 0 otherwise. Moodit is the mood proxy estimated by Facebook and Moodit*Mondayit is the interaction variable. 
F-M is the difference in returns/mood between Friday and Monday. Nineteen country dummies have been added to 
control for country variations. Datastream’s indices are used to capture market performance (TOTMK). P-values are 
shown in parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table III. Robustness tests   
Panel A: Results during and after the recent financial crisis  
 During During  After After 
Mondayit -0.0844   -0.0169  
 (0.320)   (0.646)  
Moodit 2.424*   1.108  
 (0.075)   (0.224)  
Moodit *Mondayit 4.462*   2.529  
 (0.056)   (0.153)  
Mood (F-M)  7.437   -2.660 
  (0.219)   (0.371) 
_cons -0.137 -0.139  0.054 -0.031 
 (0.213) (0.732)  (0.302) (0.857) 
N 5382 1012  10227 1873 
F statistic 1.308 0.731  0.623 0.413 
Panel B: Results for high and low correlated weeks  
 Above median Above median  Below median Below median 
Mondayit -0.0135   -0.0432  
 (0.758)   (0.318)  
Moodit 3.827***   1.965**  
 (0.000)   (0.023)  
Moodit *Mondayit 3.625**   5.215***  
 (0.024)   (0.003)  
Mood (F-M)  1.568   6.291** 
  (0.619)   (0.025) 
_cons 0.096 0.140  0.0446 0.530*** 
 (0.208) (0.604)  (0.480) (0.004) 
N 10285 1898  10558 2025 
F statistic 2.651 0.552  2.082 0.926 
This table explores the robustness of the results shown in Table II during and after the financial crisis (Panel A) and 
within high and low correlated mood weeks (Panel B). We use 6th March 2009 to split the period into during and 
after the financial crisis, and re-estimate regressions for each sub-period. The full sample period is between 
September 2007 and March 2012. We further explore whether results are driven by particular weeks where mood is 
highly or less correlated across the countries in our sample. We first estimate the correlation of mood across the 
countries in our sample and then, based on median values, we split weeks into high and low correlated, and re-
estimate regressions for each sub-sample. In particular, we estimate the following OLS regressions: Rit = ± +b 
Mondayit + c Moodit + d Mondayit * Moodit + Country Dummies+ uit  and R(F-M)it = ± + b Mood(F-M)it + Country 
Dummies + uit, where Rit is the daily natural log returns of indices i for day t, while ± is a constant variable that 
represents the average of non-Monday returns. Mondayit is a Monday dummy that takes the value of 1 if returns are 
observed on a Monday, and 0 otherwise. Moodit is the mood proxy estimated by Facebook and Moodit*Mondayit is 
the interaction variable. F-M is the difference in returns/mood between Friday and Monday. Nineteen country 
dummies have been added to control for country variations. Datastream’s indices are used to capture market 
performance (TOTMK). P-values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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Table IV. Results for small and large indices 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A: MSCI small indices   
Mondayit -0.106*** -0.0590*  
 
(0.000) (0.050)  
Moodit 
 
3.591***  
  
(0.000)  
Moodit *Mondayit 
 
4.463***  
  
(0.000)  
Mood(F-M)it 
  
1.821 
   
(0.317) 
_cons -0.186* -0.171* 0.309 
 
(0.064) (0.088) (0.328) 
N 20,352 20,352 3,984 
F statistic 1.362 5.236 0.664 
Panel B: MSCI large indices 
 Mondayit -0.065* -0.002  
 
(0.068) (0.956)  
Moodit 
 
2.608***  
  
(0.001)  
Moodit *Mondayit 
 
5.028***  
  
(0.001)  
Mood(F-M) 
  
3.398 
   
(0.259) 
_cons -0.009 0.028 0.183 
 
(0.879) (0.659) (0.411) 
N 19,570 19,570 3,593 
F statistic 0.708 2.255 0.69 
This table explores the Monday effect and the significance of mood to explain Monday returns. Results are 
estimated within MSCI small (Panel A) and large (Panel B) capitalisation indices. We estimate the following key 
OLS regressions: Rit = ± +b Mondayit + c Moodit + d Mondayit * Moodit + Country Dummies+ uit  and R(F-M)it = ± 
+ b Mood(F-M)it + Country Dummies + uit, where Rit is the daily natural log returns of indices i for day t, while ± is 
a constant variable that represents the average of non-Monday returns. Mondayit is a Monday dummy that takes the 
value of 1 if returns are observed on a Monday, and 0 otherwise. Moodit is the mood proxy estimated by Facebook 
and Moodit*Mondayit is the interaction variable. F-M is the difference in returns/mood between Friday and Monday. 
Nineteen country dummies have been added to control for country variations. P-values are shown in parentheses. * 
and *** indicate significance at the 10 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table V. The impact of culture  
 
High 
individualism 
High 
individualism 
Low 
individualism 
Low 
individualism 
 High 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
High 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
Low 
uncertainty 
avoidance 
Low 
uncertainty 
avoidance  
Mondayit -0.064* -0.021 -0.111*** -0.063  -0.099*** -0.067* -0.077** -0.015 
 (0.077) (0.600) (0.002) (0.122)  (0.005) (0.073) (0.030) (0.720) 
Moodit  1.746**  2.654***   1.673**  2.914*** 
  (0.043)  (0.000)   (0.020)  (0.000) 
Moodit *Mondayit  5.418***  3.304**   3.719**  4.749*** 
  (0.003)  (0.015)   (0.015)  (0.002) 
_cons -0.031 -0.015 0.035 0.070  0.033 0.059 -0.028 -0.005 
 (0.516) (0.760) (0.447) (0.137)  (0.460) (0.192) (0.564) (0.916) 
N 11,176 11,176 11,160 11,160  10,192 10,192 12,144 12,144 
F statistic 0.575 2.276 2.216 4.625  2.168 3.600 0.808 3.443 
This table explores the impact of culture on the results. We use the individualism level and the uncertainty avoidance index as constructed by Hofstede (2001). 
We manually collect culture variables for each country from Hofstede’s website. We first split countries into two equal-sized sub-groups based on their cultural 
value and then re-estimate the following regression for each group separately: Rit = ± +b Mondayit + c Moodit + d Mondayit * Moodit + Country Dummies+ uit, 
where Rit is the daily natural log returns of indices i for day t, while ± is a constant variable that represents the average of non-Monday returns. Mondayit is a 
Monday dummy that takes the value of 1 if returns are observed on a Monday, and 0 otherwise. Moodit is the mood proxy estimated by Facebook and 
Moodit*Mondayit is the interaction variable. Nineteen country dummies have been added to control for country variations. Datastream’s indices are used to 
capture market performance (TOTMK). P-values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table VI. Daily returns (%) 
 Full sample  MSCI indices  Individualism  Uncertainty avoidance 
   Large Small  High Low  High Low 
Panel A: Conventional strategies           
Monday returns -0.092***  -0.0844** -0.119***  -0.084** -0.101***  -0.092** -0.093** 
 (0.000)  (0.022) (0.000)  (0.031) (0.008)  (0.016) (0.016) 
           
Monday returns conditional to:   
Positive prior week average returns -0.008**  -0.017*** 0.006**  -0.115** -0.019  -0.052 -0.079* 
 (0.032)  (0.005) (0.011)  (0.010) (0.667)  (0.213) (0.090) 
Negative prior week average returns -0.121***  -0.011 -0.311***  -0.051 -0.194***  -0.139** -0.107* 
 (0.008)  (0.852) (0.000)  (0.443) (0.003)  (0.039) (0.090) 
Positive - Negative 0.114**  -0.006 0.317***  -0.641 0.175**  0.087 0.028 
 (0.014)  (0.926) (0.000)  (0.419) (0.024)  (0.271) (0.714) 
Panel B: Mood strategy          
Positive mood 0.129*  0.158** 0.140**  0.108 0.151**  0.085 0.184** 
 (0.074)  (0.021) (0.02)  (0.147) (0.014)  (0.150) (0.021) 
Negative Mood -0.144***  -0.137*** -0.176***  -0.129*** -0.159***  -0.145*** -0.143*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
Positive - Negative  0.273***  0.296*** 0.316***  0.237*** 0.311***  0.231*** 0.327*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.002) (0.000) 
This table explores the economical significance of the relation between mood and Monday returns. Panel A explores the profitability of conventional strategies 
previously developed in the literature. We first explore Monday returns and then Monday returns in relation to the previous week’s positive/negative average 
market performance. Panel B explores Monday returns when Monday’s mood is positive and negative separately. We collect individualism level and the 
uncertainty avoidance index from Hofstede’s website. Apart from MSCI large and small indices, Datastream’s indices are used to capture market performance 
(TOTMK). P-values are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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A. Returns on days with the highest 10 percent mood 
 
B.  Returns on days with the lowest 10 percent mood 
 
Figure 1. Extreme mood levels and corresponding market performance  
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